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NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE NUCLEAR BLACK 
MARKET: PROPOSING AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTING NUCLEAR 
EXPERTISE PROLIFERATION & NUCLEAR 
SMUGGLING BY NON-STATE ACTORS 
 
THOMAS BURCH 
 
"Today, every inhabitant of this planet must 
contemplate the day when this planet may 
no longer be habitable. Every man, woman 
and child lives under a nuclear sword of 
Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of 
threads, capable of being cut at any moment 
by accident or miscalculation or madness."1 
~ JFK    
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a distinct possibility that “madness” will lead to the next 
nuclear conflict. Terrorist groups, and even terrorist individuals, have the 
money, means, and motive to build or purchase their own nuclear device2 
and some have already tried.3  Unfortunately, the terrorist attempt to 
acquire and use nuclear weapons is a natural progression of events. 
However, the rapidity of the progression is disturbing. Terrorists are 
utilizing computerized files, e-mail, and encryption software in order to 
                                                 
1 President John F. Kennedy, Address at the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 25, 
1961). While it is more likely that President Kennedy was referring to the instability of 
certain despotic leaders when he spoke of “madness,” the same general principle still 
applies to individual terrorist or terrorist groups. 
2 See Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes: The Terrorist Nuclear Threat: Hearing Before 
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of Senator 
Joseph Biden, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Forign Relations). 
3 See Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 106th 
Cong. 9 (1999) (testimony of George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency) 
[hereinafter Worldwide Threats I]. 
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hasten the accomplishment of their objectives.4 It may not be a question of 
if they acquire nuclear weapons, but only a question of when.  
While there are a number of disincentives that prevent states from 
participating in the nuclear black market, most of these deterrents do not 
apply to non-state actors. What actions should the international 
community take in order to enforce these same restrictions against non-
state actors and thereby reduce the possibility of nuclear conflict? This 
comment proposes two options. First, member parties could amend one or 
all of several existing treaties on the subject. Second, the international 
community can draft a new treaty or convention on nuclear smuggling and 
proliferation that focuses on preventing non-state actors from participating 
in the nuclear black market. This paper addresses both options and 
concludes that the latter alternative would be the most effective means of 
combating nuclear terrorism. Part II explains the background of the 
terrorist threat by discussing why non-state actors may have access to, and 
be willing to use, nuclear weapons. Part III discusses why the expansion of 
existing treaties and the extension of universal jurisdiction to cover these 
crimes are not satisfactory preventative measures. Part IV calls for a new 
international convention that focuses on efforts to forestall nuclear 
terrorism.  
 
II. ESCALATING THREATS:  
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION & THE EVOLVING TERRORIST OBJECTIVE 
 
The U.S. Secretary of Defense recently stated that weapons of 
mass destruction “will increasingly find their way into the hands of 
individuals and groups of fanatical terrorists or self-proclaimed 
                                                 
4 Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 106th Cong. 
617 (2000) (testimony of George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency) 
[hereinafter Worldwide Threats II]. 
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apocalyptic prophets.”5 Several terrorist groups have shown an interest in, 
or actively sought, nuclear materials in recent years, believing it to be part 
of their “religious duty.”6 In recognition of this risk, President Bush is 
seeking a thirty percent spending increase for programs that aim to keep 
nuclear material out of terrorists' hands.7 Most of the money will go to 
help Russia secure its nuclear facilities, which are probably the most 
prolific sources of black market nuclear material.8 
Nevertheless, while spending money on physical protection of the 
materials is important, the scope of the problem is greater than a need for 
physical security alone. The international community should adopt explicit 
legal guidelines for the prevention and punishment of nuclear smuggling 
and nuclear expertise proliferation. The connection between these 
activities and international terrorism is well-accepted and extensively 
documented.9  Developing an international convention that unequivocally 
proscribes these activities and establishes legitimate preventative measures 
may do more than delay the inevitable; it may help to avoid the problem 
altogether.  
There are three broad explanations for the increased risk that 
terrorists will acquire and use nuclear weapons in the near future: (1) the 
proliferation of nuclear information, (2) the availability of nuclear 
weapons & improvised nuclear devices, and (3) the evolving terrorist 
                                                 
5 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND 
RESPONSE at i (2001). 
6 See Worldwide Threats I, at 9. 
7 Bush Wants to Spend More to Safeguard Nuclear Materials; Most of the Money Would 
Help Russia, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2003, at A6. 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1373, U.N. SCORG AOR, 4385th Mtg. U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373Meeting (2001) available at http://www.una-
ukundcp.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/sc1373res_1373_english.pdf. 
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objective.10  The following sections discuss these problems and lay the 
foundation for developing the proposed legal framework.  
 
A. Proliferation of Nuclear Expertise 
Since the beginning of the nuclear age, numerous books, journals, 
and websites have published blueprints for creating nuclear devices. 
However, these resources are of minimal value for anyone actually 
wanting to build such a weapon because this undertaking requires highly 
specialized knowledge. Persons equipped with the proper technical 
knowledge hold a Damoclean sword because selling or sharing this 
information could result in the wrong person or groups possessing nuclear 
capabilities.  
The two most notable sources of information proliferation are the 
“brain drain” and insider theft.11  These two categories are not completely 
distinguishable as they both produce the same result. In both scenarios, 
terrorists receive information necessary for building a nuclear weapon. 
However, insider theft encompasses a slightly broader set of crimes and 
includes a somewhat larger group of individuals. The concept of “brain 
drain” only applies to a limited group of highly skilled employees. 
Nevertheless, the brain drain dilemma poses a greater risk exactly because 
of these special skills.  
 
 
                                                 
10 See Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures: Hearings Before the Military Research 
and Dev. Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Nat'l Sec., 105th Cong. 54-59 (1997) 
(statement of Jessica Eve Stern, Former Director of Russian and Ukrainian Affairs, Nat'l 
Sec. Council) [hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures]. 
11 See Adam Treiger, Comment, Plugging the Russian Brain Drain: Criminalizing 
Nuclear-Expertise Proliferation, 82 Geo. L.J. 237, 238 (1993); BRUCE 
HOFFMAN, ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, INSIDER CRIME: THE 
THREAT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND PROGRAMS 7-30 (1990). 
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1. Brain Drain    
“Brain drain” refers to the problem of experienced and 
knowledgeable scientists moving to countries that have no nuclear 
program and sharing their knowledge and experience with those countries. 
It may be the most dangerous form of information proliferation and the 
problem is particularly troublesome in Russia and the former Soviet 
Union.12  Thousands of Soviet scientists and engineers worked on 
developing one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world before 
suffering severe pay cuts or job loss after the collapse of the Soviet 
empire.13  Although most probably recognize the dangers of disseminating 
their knowledge to third world countries or terrorist groups, it only takes a 
few scientists to actually build a nuclear device.14  Because the economic 
incentives to sell nuclear information may be too strong, the international 
community has a strong security interest in eliminating the threat.  
It is only fair to mention that the problem does not rest solely in the 
former Soviet Union. Pakistan recently arrested two nuclear scientists who 
allegedly met with Osama Bin Laden to discuss nuclear capabilities for the 
al-Queda terrorist network. Pakistan detained the scientists after receiving 
a report of their meeting from U.S. law enforcement officials, but released 
the two men after a brief period of interrogation.15  “Although Pakistani 
authorities concluded the scientists violated a secrecy oath during trips 
into Taliban-controlled Afghanistan … [a] trial, officials said, would 
generate further international embarrassment and risk disclosure of 
                                                 
12 See Treiger, supra note 11, at 238. 
13 See id. at 237-41. 
14 See id. at 241. 
15 Peter Baker & Kamran Khan, Pakistan to Forgo Charges Against 2 Nuclear Scientists; 
Ties to Bin Laden Suspected, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2002, at A1. 
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Pakistan's nuclear secrets.”16  Pakistan placed its national interests ahead 
of international security.  
Even if Pakistan made a sound decision in this particular case, the 
international community cannot continue to place its security in the hands 
of individual nations. Controlling the flow of nuclear expertise is a global 
problem and it calls for a global response. There may be too many 
incentives for individuals to divulge information about, or help in the 
creation of, nuclear weapons. Additionally, even if the proliferator's native 
country prohibits nuclear expertise proliferation, as was the case with 
Pakistan , there may be too many reasons for the individual country not to 
prosecute. Creating an international convention which would proscribe 
these activities is a logical step in the direction of effective prevention.  
 
2. Insider Theft17 
Nuclear facilities face threats from a variety of “potential 
adversaries with ideological, economic, and personal motives.”18 
Unfortunately, the greatest threat comes from their employees. While a 
number of factors contribute to an employee's decision to steal, age is the 
most likely indicator.19  In a study of insider/outsider crime performed for 
the Department of Energy, approximately one half of the employees who 
conspired with an outsider were less than thirty years old.20  Nevertheless, 
even long term employees may resort to stealing nuclear information for 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 There are three general categories of insider theft: (1) crimes committed by insiders 
conspiring with outsiders, (2) crimes committed by insiders conspiring with other 
insiders, and (3) crimes committed by lone insiders. Nevertheless, the first category is the 
most likely scenario because terrorists working with an insider are probably more likely 
to attempt a crime against a nuclear facility than either set of individuals in (1) or (2). 
HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 7-30. 
18 See id. at 1. 
19 Id. at 7-9. 
20 Id.  
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profit, believing they have been overlooked for promotions or believing 
the facility has not guaranteed that the employee will retire in comfort.21 
The problem of insider theft at nuclear facilities is almost as 
serious as the threat of scientists selling their knowledge in the nuclear 
black market. It certainly includes a larger section of the scientific 
community because even low level employees may have access to, or the 
ability to obtain, sensitive information.22  It also produces the same 
general result in that terrorists receive classified nuclear secrets. Because 
this is a constant, the international community should address the issue in 
a new convention in nuclear terrorism.  
 
B. Nuclear Smuggling 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented 
181 cases of nuclear trafficking since 1993.23  The majority of these cases 
involved materials that could be used in an improvised nuclear device, 
which is a makeshift device intended to result in the formation of a low-
yield nuclear reaction. However, twenty cases involved “weapons-grade” 
nuclear material, the most perilous form of nuclear material because of its 
potential use in full-scale, high-yield nuclear weapons.24  For example, in 
December of 1994, police officials in Prague arrested three nuclear 
workers from Eastern Europe who were transporting three kilograms of 
highly enriched uranium. Officials believed that the material came from 
either a Russian Navy storage facility or a fuel fabrication site in the 
                                                 
21 Id. at 9. 
22 Id. at 7-9. 
23 Elizabeth Sullivan, Nuclear Security is Frighteningly Lax All Over, THE 
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 30, 2002, at H5. 
24 Id. 
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former Soviet Union.25  Russia and the former Soviet Union are the most 
likely suspects in these type of situations because only one third of their 
facilities are considered secure.26 
What are other countries doing to prevent smuggled material from 
entering their borders? In the United States, the Customs Service recently 
issued pocket-sized radiation detectors to customs inspectors at more than 
300 entry points across the nation.27  However, with lengthy borders and 
such an expansive coastline, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to catch 
all such material before it enters the country. Nevertheless, the U.S. is 
fortunate because most countries do not have the means to enact such 
preventative measures. Consequently, international cooperation is 
essential in the fight against nuclear smuggling. The international 
community must work together to effectively close down the nuclear black 
market and eliminate the nuclear threat by creating a new international 
agreement that focuses on two specific forms of nuclear smuggling: (1) 
the transportation of uranium or plutonium that can be used in building an 
improvised nuclear device, and (2) the transportation of a completed 
nuclear weapon.  
 
1. Improvised Nuclear Devices    
Building an improvised nuclear device (IND) is not a complicated 
process. “If you had a softball-sized lump of enriched uranium, some 
materials mostly available at Radio Shack and an engineering grad from 
an American university, you would have a reasonable chance of making a 
                                                 
25 Barry Kellman & David S. Gualtieri, Barricading the Nuclear Window: A Legal 
Regime to Curtail Nuclear Smuggling, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV . 667, 672 (1996). This 
shows that insider crime and nuclear smuggling are often interrelated. 
26 Vicki Haddock, Loose Nukes: A Radioactive “Dirty Bomb” Could be Headed for Your 
Neighborhood, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, April 28, 2002, at D1. 
27 Jeannine Aversa, Customs to Issue Radiation Detectors; Agency Offers No Guarantees, 
SUN-SENTINEL, May 30, 2002, at A11. 
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crude nuclear weapon.”28 The only difficult part of the equation is finding 
the nuclear material. However, even this is not a complicated problem 
because there are two main sources where the material is readily available: 
(1) the former Soviet Union , and (2) nuclear reprocessing facilities.29 
Senator Joe Biden explains where one side of the risk originates:  
Over the past two years, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee has held a series of 
hearings outlining the threat posed by 
weapons of mass destruction to U.S. 
national security. In the course of these 
hearings, one simple fact has stood out. 
There are many sources for weapons of 
mass destruction, and it can take years to 
obtain or build them. But there's one place 
that has it all. That place is Russia.30   
 
In fact, Russia still possesses approximately 1,000 metric tons of 
highly enriched uranium, and 160 metric tons of weapons grade 
plutonium.31 “Some of this material is secured with the equivalent of 
bicycle locks.”32  INDs do not require a critical mass of uranium or 
                                                 
28 The Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Safeguarding Against Acts of 
Terrorism: Hearings Before the International Operations and Human Rights Subcomm. 
of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of the Hon. 
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairperson, Subcomm. on International Operations and Human 
Rights) (quoting Graham Allison, Director, Harvard Belfer Center ) [hereinafter 
International Atomic Energy Agency].  Experts often dispute terrorists' abilities to 
produce even an improvised nuclear device. However, most seem to agree that, with the 
right materials and time, it is entirely possible. See GAVIN CAMERON, NUCLEAR 
TERRORISM: A THREAT ASSESMENT FOR THE 21st CENTURY 131 (1999). 
29 See Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 25, at 671-75. 
30 Loose Nukes, Biological Terrorism, and Chemical Warfare: Using Russian Debt to 
Enhance Security: Hearings Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 107th 
Cong. 65 (2002) (statement of Senator Joe Biden, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign 
Relations) [hereinafter Loose Nukes]. This paper is not an attempt to criticize Russia and 
the former Soviet Union. However, these regions present a major risk and they provide a 
good example of why certain measures need to be taken to reduce the risk of a nuclear 
terrorist conflict. 
31 Id. 
32 Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures, at 56. 
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plutonium, and the material may not have to be “weapons-grade.”33  In 
fact, plutonium oxide, which is often stored at reprocessing plants, can be 
converted to plutonium metal in a straightforward chemical process.34  
This is a frightening prospect considering the lack of security at 
reprocessing plants worldwide. Nuclear energy supporters often attempt to 
allay security fears by using phrases like “nuclear plants are probably the 
most hardened commercial structures in the world.”35  This is not a 
legitimate answer. There are seventy-plus storage centers in the U.S. alone 
and, internationally, ninety-three new reactors will be operating by 2016.36  
Certainly the best answer for security concerns cannot be that these 
facilities are “hardened.” Storage centers and reprocessing plants suffer 
from a severe lack of financial support and the international community 
should carefully address this need in a new convention on nuclear 
terrorism.  
 
2.  Loose Nukes 
While finding and purchasing a completed nuclear weapon might 
be incredibly complicated, it is not impossible. At a recent hearing before 
the House Committee on National Security, a former Director of Russian 
and Ukrainian Affairs for the National Security Council stated that 
“[s]enior Russian officials have expressed grave concerns about 
inadequate security for warheads in transit as well as in storage.”37  Also, 
the Russian military “faces ‘chronic shortages' of specially equipped trains 
                                                 
33 See CAMERON, supra note 28, at 131-32. 
34 Id. at 132. 
35 Senator Pete Domenici, The Need for Nuclear Energy – Four Years after the Harvard 
Speech, Address at Texas A & M University (November 19, 2001) available at 
http://nuclearanswer.tamu.edu/Domenici.pdf. 
36 Id. 
37 See Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures, at 56. 
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to protect against acts of sabotage.”38  The possibility that terrorists can 
acquire a completed nuclear weapon is not unthinkable. Many countries 
are unable to provide adequate security for these weapons because of their 
depressed economic conditions.39 
Inadequate security at nuclear facilities is a serious threat that 
requires significant attention. During the last decade, Congress authorized 
more than three billion dollars for a Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
program aimed at securing Russian facilities.40  However, this is a 
unilateral approach and involving the international community is 
necessary for reducing the potential threat. Creating an international 
convention that focuses on, among other things, securing nuclear facilities 
will go a long way in preventing terrorists from achieving their new 
objectives.  
C. The Evolving Terrorist Objective 
Until recently, most terrorist activities involved relatively low-
level violence. However, many terrorist groups are progressively 
loosening their moral or political inhibitions.41  Radicals are no longer 
constrained by fear of reprisal because they are obsessed with extremist 
ideas of immortality. The pursuit of immortality produces a frightening 
prospect in that terrorist are now willing to take extreme measures to 
achieve catastrophic results.  
In March of 2002, several news sources reported an alleged plan to 
bring a nuclear device to New York City.42  This turned out to be a hoax, 
but it raises awareness about a new set of terrorist objectives. Nuclear 
terrorists may “be intent on inducing casualties, perhaps immediately as 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 See id. 
40 PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 5, at 73.  
41 See id. at 56-57. 
42 See, e.g., Megan Turner, Terror ‘Plot' to Nuke N.Y. Revealed, N.Y. POST, March 4, 
2002, at A3. 
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the result of radiation sickness, or longer term, as the result of cancers that 
might be induced by radiation exposure.”43  Introducing nuclear weapons 
to a densely populated environment exemplifies the new terrorist goal. 
Prior to World War II, no one worried about such a possibility, but today, 
this is a constant threat.  
Terrorists have the ability to achieve at least some of their 
objectives and several courses of action are necessary to prevent this from 
happening. Section III discusses existing conventions on nuclear terrorism 
but it concludes that such conventions are inadequate preventative 
measures. They are not comprehensive and most focus on punishment 
rather than prevention. Nevertheless, understanding the weaknesses of 
these instruments will help to develop the proposed convention in Section 
IV.  
III.  EXPLORING EXISTING TREATIES, CONVENTIONS  
& OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAWS 
 
States have numerous reasons to avoid participating in the nuclear 
black market: economic sanctions, military reprisal, etc. However, most 
deterrents do not apply to non-state actors. What actions should the 
international community take in order to enforce these same restrictions 
against individuals or terrorist groups, and thereby reduce the possibility 
of nuclear conflict?  
As a preliminary matter, the international community should 
recognize nuclear smuggling and nuclear-expertise proliferation by non-
state actors as international crimes. One way of accomplishing this 
recognition would be to amend or expand any or all of the following 
international instruments: (1) the Non-Proliferation Treaty;44 (2) the 
                                                 
43 See Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes, supra note 2, at 16 (statement of Dr. Steven E. 
Koonin, Provost, California Institute of Technology). 
44 See Treiger, supra note 11, at 241-46. 
                     Vol. 2 [2003]       NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET 96  
                                                              Thomas Burch 
 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials;45 (3) the 
Rome Statute;46 or (4) the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombing. However, amending these treaties and conventions 
may prove unworkable. Expanding jurisdiction under customary 
international law is another option, but many, if not most, nations require 
lawmaking bodies to incorporate customary international law into 
domestic law before the nation's courts will recognize such law in judicial 
proceedings.47 Thus, drafting a new convention that focuses on preventing 
non-state actors from participating in the nuclear black market is essential. 
Amending the existing treaties or expanding jurisdiction under customary 
international law are not satisfactory methods for reducing the terrorist 
nuclear threat.  
A. Amending the Non-Proliferation Treaty to Cover  
Non-State Actors 
1. Scope of the Agreement  
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is 
the most comprehensive attempt to control the spread of nuclear materials 
and nuclear expertise.48  It is more than thirty years old and every nation is 
a party to the treaty except for Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan, and North 
Korea.49 
                                                 
45 See Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 25, at 714-15. 
46 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 121, 37 I.L.M. 
999. [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
47 See Treiger, supra note 11, at 250-58; INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, HARD CASES: BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS TO JUSTICE 
ABROAD , A GUIDE TO UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 39 (1999), available at 
http://www.ichrp.org/ac/excerpts/10.pdf (last visited Jan 26, 2004 ). 
48 See Jeffrey B. Fugal, Comment, A Brief Survey of the Smuggling of Fissile Material: 
An Embryonic Phenomena with a Terrifying Future in the European Community, 6 IND. 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 289, 301 (1995). 
49 PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 5, at 73. 
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Under the NPT, the five nuclear weapons states50 agree not to 
export nuclear weapons to other nuclear states and not to assist any non-
nuclear weapon state in the manufacture of nuclear devices.51 The non-
nuclear states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons and to work with the 
IAEA to ensure that they only use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.52  
The acceptance of, and adherence to, these duties is essential for the 
government to perform effectively.  
Article I of the NPT states:  
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any 
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices or control 
over such weapons or explosive devices 
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to 
assist, encourage, or induce any non-
nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices, or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices.53  
 
Article II covers the duties of non-nuclear nations:  
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer 
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
or of control over such weapons or 
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not 
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; 
and not to seek or receive any assistance in 
                                                 
50 Nuclear weapons states only include those countries which had manufactured and 
exploded a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967. That includes the U.S., the United 
Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art. I, 21 U.S.T. 
483, 487, 79 U.N.T.S. 161, 171 [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty], available at 
http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html (last visited Jan 26, 2004 ). 
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the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices.54 
 
Expanding Articles I & II to include non-state actors will 
automatically make nuclear expertise proliferation and nuclear smuggling 
an international crime.55  This would not only send a message that the 
international community will not tolerate a nuclear black market; “it 
would also lead to the establishment of affirmative programs of 
enforcement” in each member state.56  Finally, it would establish virtual 
universal jurisdiction over the crimes since all but five nations are 
members of the NPT, making the actions punishable in almost every 
country in the world.  
 
2. The Amendment Process & Questioning the Stability of the NPT 
The amendment process for the NPT is fairly straightforward. One-
third of the member-nations must request a conference to consider the 
amendment, and a majority of the countries at the meeting must approve 
the modification.57  At the 2000 conference of NPT members, the parties 
agreed to extend the Treaty indefinitely and to eventually accomplish total 
nuclear disarmament.58  However, the circumstances surrounding the NPT 
have changed tremendously since 2000, and amending the Treaty may be 
a difficult task because it is unstable as it stands.59 
In January 2003, North Korea dropped out after more than 
seventeen years as a member of the agreement.60  This decision allows 
                                                 
54 Id. at art. II. 
55 See Treiger, supra note 11, at 241-45; Fugal, supra note 44, at 301-05. 
56 See id. at 248. 
57 Non-Proliferation Treaty, at art. VIII. 
58 PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 5, at 73. 
59 See Treiger, supra note 11, at 244. 
60 Sonni Efron & Lianne Hart, The World Diplomatic Standoff: North Korean Action 
Draws Global Condemnation, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A1. 
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North Korea to completely avoid the regulations of the IAEA, and, 
according to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, North Korea 
poses a severe threat in terms of nuclear proliferation to non-state actors.61 
This fact alone should make the parties to the NPT focus on the 
relative weakness of the NPT's enforcement controls. Rather than 
attempting to change the face of the NPT by including non-state actors, 
member countries should strongly consider amending the Article X to 
strengthen the Treaty's enforcement mechanisms.62  Strengthening the 
existing Agreement will still assist in preventing nuclear smuggling and 
information proliferation. In addition to this, however, the international 
community should draft a new agreement that specifically focuses on non-
state actors and the problems discussed in Section II of this paper. The 
new agreement will extend the protections in the NPT and the 
international community should draft the new agreement with the 
principles of the NPT in mind.  
 
B. Amending & Expanding the Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Materials 
 
1. Background on the CPPNM 
Sixty-eight nations have adopted the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Materials, making it the second most widely 
adopted treaty on nuclear proliferation.63  Under the agreement, all 
signatory parties agree to criminalize “the receipt, possession, use, 
                                                 
61 James Dao, U.S. Official Says North Korea Could Sell Bomb Material, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 9, 2003, at A1. 
62 Non-Proliferation Treaty, at art. X. At the very least, an amendment to Article X 
should: (1) include stiff sanctions for countries that violate the NPT and then decide to 
drop out, and (2) extend the current three month notice period to provide more time for 
negotiations and more time for countries to reconsider their decision. See Non-
Proliferation Treaty, at art. X. 
63 See Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 25, at 714-15. 
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transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material” and the “theft 
or robbery of nuclear material” by non-state actors.64  However, the 
Convention only covers nuclear materials that are used for peaceful 
purposes.65  It does not apply to nuclear materials in military stockpiles, 
which actually poses one of the most serious threats.66  Thus a 
considerable gap exists in the Convention's coverage.67  While the current 
restrictions in the Convention are important, extending the Convention's 
coverage to nuclear material that is not used for peaceful purposes is 
absolutely necessary because this is the most prolific source of material on 
the nuclear black market.68 
Under Article XX of the CPPNM, any state party may propose an 
amendment to the Convention.69  The proposed amendment is circulated 
to all parties, and if two-thirds of the parties call for a conference to vote 
on the proposal, a conference will take place no sooner than thirty days 
after invitations to the conference are issued.70  If the amendment is 
approved by two-thirds of all state parties, then it will enter into force for 
each party that ratifies the provision thirty days after the ratification.71  
 
2.  An Effective yet Limited Agreement  
The United States or any other state party to the Convention could 
propose an amendment to make the convention apply to nuclear material 
not used for peaceful purposes. The earlier the amendment is proposed, 
                                                 
64 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, art. 
VII(1)(a)-(b), 18 U.S.C. § 831 (2000), [hereinafter Physical Protection Convention] 
available at http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism_convention_nuclear_material.html. 
65 Id. at art. II(1). 
66 Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 25, at 714-15. 
67 Id. at 715. 
68 See Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures, at 56-57; Loose Nukes, at 65. 
69 Physical Protection Convention, at art. 20(1). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at art. 20(2). 
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the easier the amendment process should be because fewer countries will 
need to agree with the proposal and all future signatories will be bound by 
the terms of the agreement when they sign.  
However, one can never predict the potential political 
complications of such a process and it may take time to obtain the 
amendment. Furthermore, even if the parties to the agreement approved 
such an amendment, the CPPNM would still be too limited in scope 
because it would not cover nuclear information proliferation. The CPPNM 
only applies to the illegal transfer of “material,” and, according to the 
definition provided in the text of the Convention, “material” only includes 
plutonium and uranium.72  Changing the definition to include some form 
of nuclear knowledge may be somewhat outside of the scope of the 
Convention and may be difficult to pass in an amendment process.  
Nevertheless, members of the Convention should encourage other 
countries to participate in the current agreement. More nations need to 
criminalize nuclear smuggling to reduce the number of safe havens for 
non-state actors that participate in the nuclear black market. The CPPNM 
is an effective tool for combating nuclear smuggling, but it is just too 
limited in scope. Drafting an entirely new agreement is still the best 
option, and it is necessary to fill the gap left by other conventions.  
 
C. A Liberal Interpretation of the Rome Statute 
Negotiations for the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court began with a United Nations resolution in 1995 and ended with the 
adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998.73  The statute has 128 Articles,74 is 
                                                 
72 Id. at art. 1(a). 
73 John Washburn, The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal 
Court and International Lawmaking in the 21 st Century, 11 PACE INT'L L. REV. 361, 
363 (1999). 
74 Id. 
                     Vol. 2 [2003]       NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET 102  
                                                              Thomas Burch 
 
signed by 120 nations,75 and is intended to have “jurisdiction over persons 
for the most serious crimes of international concern….”76 
Amending the Rome Statute would be the most difficult means of 
classifying nuclear smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation as 
international crimes. The Treaty cannot be amended until seven years after 
it entered into force (2008), and any amendment requires approval by 
seven-eighths of the State Parties.77  Additionally, the Rome Statute is the 
subject of some amount of controversy. Some believe that it undermines 
the authority of the UN Security Council and that it improperly asserts 
jurisdiction over citizens of countries that are not parties to the 
Agreement.78  Because of these perceptions, many nations have not signed 
the Treaty.79  Finally, there may be a problem with including nuclear 
smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation in the Rome Statute because 
the Treaty only covers genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
the crime of aggression.80  Classifying nuclear smuggling or nuclear 
information proliferation within any of these categories is a bit of a 
stretch.  
 
1. Crimes Against Humanity  
The definition of crimes against humanity is extremely vague. The 
Rome Statute describes this category of crimes as activities that (1) “are 
                                                 
75 Id. at 361. 
76 Rome Statute, at art. 1. 
77 Id. at art. 121(1). 
78 M. Tia Johnson, The American Service Members' Protection Act: Protecting Whom?, 
43 VA. J. INT'L L . 405, 475-76 (2003). Ms. Johnson is a Colonel in the Judge Advocate 
General's Corps, U.S. Army. Since June 2002, she has been deployed to Bosnia as the 
Senior Legal Advisor to the NATO Peacekeeping Force. 
79 See id. 
80 Rome Statute, at art. 5(1); see also L EILA NADYA SADAT, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENIUM 132-64 (M. Cherif 
Bassiouni ed., 2002). 
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among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole,” (2) “warrant and entail individual criminal responsibility,” 
and (3) “require conduct which is impermissible under generally 
applicable international law, as recognized by the principle legal systems 
of the world.”81  The crimes of nuclear expertise proliferation and nuclear 
smuggling could satisfy these elements, thereby granting jurisdiction over 
these activities to the International Criminal Court. However, the 
international community leans toward a rigid interpretation that includes 
only the most horrendous activities, such as genocide. Nuclear smuggling 
and proliferation do not fit within this category.  
 
2.  Crimes of Aggression 
Nuclear smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation could also 
qualify as crimes of aggression if members of the Treaty adopt a liberal 
definition of this category of crimes. Crimes of aggression theoretically 
include state actions that severely intrude upon the sovereignty of another 
state, but no official classification of the crime actually exists.82  The 
Rome Statute explicitly states that the ICC will not exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression until members of the Treaty adopt a provision 
defining the crime in accordance with Articles 121 & 123 of the 
Agreement.83  However, states are unlikely to classify the crime in its 
conventional sense anytime soon, because then any attack or use of force 
by one state against another might be punishable under this category.84 
Adopting a definition of crimes of aggression that focuses on non-
state actors rather than nation-states should be more acceptable to the 
members of the Treaty because it eliminates the potential threat to national 
                                                 
81 Rome Statute, at art. 7(1). 
82 SADAT, supra note 80, at 132-34. 
83 Id. 
84 See id. at 133, n. 20. Note 20 defines the “conventional” crimes of aggression. 
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sovereignty. Members should not disagree over whether to prosecute 
persons for these activities since it would not involve State liability. 
Therefore, including these provisions should alleviate any concerns over 
State liability and should improve the chances of adding such an 
amendment to the Treaty.85  However, nuclear smuggling and nuclear 
information proliferation are truly not crimes of aggression. This category 
of crimes just happens to have a name that theoretically could include a 
broad number of offenses. Actually, the category of crimes of aggression 
is somewhat limited in scope and the proper method of addressing nuclear 
smuggling and nuclear information proliferation is through a new draft 
convention.  
 
3.  A Final Consideration 
There is one more concern for amending the Statute to include 
nuclear crimes. The original negotiators of the Rome Statute intentionally 
excluded the use of nuclear weapons from the list of weapons that are 
illegal per se. However, this was because of political differences between 
nuclear and non-nuclear states and it has nothing to do with the terrorist 
acts of non-state actors.86  The parties to the Treaty should be willing to 
codify nuclear smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation as 
international crimes because these activities, unlike the use of nuclear 
                                                 
85 The amendment to the Rome Statute would have to include a bright line rule that 
anyone apprehended for nuclear smuggling or nuclear expertise proliferation is presumed 
to be acting in an individual capacity, not on behalf of the State. However, many nations 
may have a problem with including a provision that would theoretically allow another 
country's court system to prosecute the outside nations' State Officials as non-state actors. 
In fact, the ICJ recently ruled that State officials have immunity from prosecution in the 
national courts of another country while they are in office. See Case Concerning the 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium ) ( Feb 
14, 2002 ) [(hereinafter Congo v. Belgium ]. But see In re Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M . 68 
(1998) (holding that national officials are not protected by sovereign immunity for acts 
that are prohibited by treaty or customary international law). 
86 SADAT, supra note 80, at 267. 
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weapons by a State Party, are per se objectionable. Nevertheless, the 
proper means of explicitly classifying these activities as international 
crimes is to draft a new convention, not force nuclear smuggling and 
proliferation into an ill-fitted document simply because it already exists.  
 
D. Shortcomings of the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombing 
 
The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombing (TBC) criminalizes the delivery, discharge, placement, or 
detonation of an explosive device in “ a place of public use, a State or 
government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure 
facility.”87  The United States started negotiations for the TBC in 1996 
after terrorists placed a bomb in the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi 
Arabia, killing seventeen members of the United States Air Force.88  
However, even though the U.S. started the TBC negotiations, and was the 
first country to sign the Convention, Congress has not ratified the 
agreement. Nevertheless, twenty-seven countries are currently members of 
the TBC.89 
The creation of the TBC further proves that the international 
community is taking important steps to prevent terrorist activities. 
However, this Convention is too limited in scope. It fails to cover nuclear 
                                                 
87 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, Jan. 12, 1998 , 
entered into force May, 2001, art. II(1) 37 I.L.M. 239 [hereinafter Terrorist Bombing 
Convention], available at 
http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism_convention_terrorist_bombing.html (entered into 
force May, 2001) (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). 
88 Sean D. Murphy, Conventions on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and on 
Financing, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 255, 256 (2002). 
89 CAMPAIGN FOR U.N. REFORM: BRINGING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 
TO JUSTICE, BACKGROUND ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR 
THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS, available at 
http://www.cunr.org/priorities/International%20Convention%20for%20the%20Suppressi
on%20of%20Terrorist%20Bombings.htm. (last visited Mar. 25, 2003). 
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expertise proliferation and, since the TBC only applies to completed 
explosive devices, it neglects the smuggling of nuclear material that has 
not yet been made into an explosive device. Even if the parties to the TBC 
liberally interpret the provisions of the Convention to cover the smuggling 
of nuclear material as an “accomplice” activity,90 countries could still only 
punish the smugglers after the material is used to build an explosive 
device that is delivered, placed, detonated, or discharged. At this point, the 
terrorist already achieved his goal. Either the bomb has detonated and 
caused mass destruction, or, at the very least, someone has delivered or 
placed the device in a public facility, spreading intense public fear when 
the public learns of the event. Countries should focus on preemptively 
curtailing these activities, not on punishment after the fact.  
Additionally, the TBC requires a specific intent “to cause death or 
serious bodily injury” or a specific intent “to cause extensive destruction 
of such a place, facility or system, where such destruction results in or is 
likely to result in major economic loss.”91  The specific intent standard is 
too high. Simple possession of plutonium or uranium should suffice for 
prosecution since courts can presume intent to harm from the possession 
of such dangerous materials. Considering the scope of the TBC's 
insufficiency with regards to nuclear smuggling and nuclear information 
proliferation, an amendment to cover these activities would almost require 
a redrafting of the entire Convention.  
 
E. Expanding Jurisdiction under Customary International Law 
1. The Principle of Universal Jurisdiction 
Universal jurisdiction may attach to the crimes of nuclear 
smuggling and nuclear information proliferation under customary 
                                                 
90 See Terrorist Bombing Convention, at art. II(1). 
91 Id. 
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international law.92 However, expanding universal jurisdiction to cover 
these crimes will require an active judiciary. To date, no court has been 
faced with the issue of whether these activities are atrocious enough to fall 
within the scope of universal jurisdiction, and courts may be unwilling to 
expand the application of the doctrine without valid justification, i.e. prior 
case history to support their decision.93  However, the exercise of 
jurisdiction over these crimes is acceptable so long as it is reasonable, and 
reasonable is a loose term.94  A brief survey of analogous case law and 
relevant literature will show that such an expansion may be justified.  
Universal jurisdiction allows states to punish “certain conduct 
outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the 
security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.”95 
The doctrine is based on the theory that some crimes are so universally 
condemned that the perpetrators are enemies of all people and can be 
punished in any and all jurisdictions.96 
Originally, only piracy and slave trading qualified for universal 
punishment.97  However, the category of qualifying offenses has 
significantly expanded over the last fifty years to include “certain terrorist 
acts, hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, apartheid, torture, and other 
human rights violations.”98 
                                                 
92 See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 785, 791-801 (1988); Treiger, supra note 11, at 253-58; Kellman & Gualtieri, 
supra note 25, at 719. 
93 See, e.g., United States v. Suerte, No. 00-0659, 2001 WL 1877264 *5 (S.D. Tex. Jun 
06, 2001), rev'd on other grounds, by United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
94 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2) (1987). For 
example, exercising jurisdiction is reasonable if “the person … had carried on outside the 
state an activity having a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within the state.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2)(j) (1987). 
95 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(3) (1987). 
96 United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 840 (9th Cir. 1994). 
97 See Randall, supra note 9293, at 791-801. 
98 Id. at 788-89. 
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Perhaps one of the more interesting U.S. cases involving universal 
jurisdiction is United States v. Yunis.99  Yunis was one of four hijackers 
that took control of Royal Jordanian Airlines Flight 402 shortly before its 
departure from Beirut, Lebanon. After a series of forced cross-
Mediterranean flights, which included several layovers for fuel and 
supplies, the four men directed the pilot to return to Beirut . Once in 
Beirut, the hijackers released the passengers, held a press conference, blew 
up the plane, and fled from the airport. An American investigation 
determined that Yunis was the leader of the group, which prompted the 
FBI to plan for Yunis' arrest - even though Yunis was still in Lebanon.100 
Undercover FBI agents lured Yunis onto a 
yacht in the eastern Mediterranean Sea with 
promises of a drug deal, and arrested him 
once the vessel entered international waters. 
The agents transferred Yunis to a United 
States Navy munitions ship and interrogated 
him for several days as the vessel steamed 
toward a second rendezvous, this time with a 
Navy aircraft carrier. Yunis was flown to 
Andrews Air Force Base from the aircraft 
carrier, and taken from there to Washington 
, D.C. In Washington , Yunis was arraigned 
on an original indictment charging him with 
conspiracy, hostage taking, and aircraft 
damage. A grand jury subsequently returned 
a superseding indictment adding additional 
aircraft damage counts and a charge of air 
piracy.101 
 
                                                 
99 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) [Yunis II]. 
100 Id. at 1089. 
101 Id. Yunis argued that the court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction in light of 
the government's conduct; however, the court disagreed, stating that “while the 
government's conduct was neither ‘picture perfect' nor ‘a model for law enforcement 
behavior,'…we now find nothing in the record suggesting the sort of intentional, 
outrageous government conduct necessary to sustain appellant's jurisdictional argument.” 
Id. at 1093. 
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The Federal Court for the District of D.C. held that hijacking an 
aircraft is a crime that is universally condemned, basing its decision on 
several international treaties that specifically covered the subject.102  The 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the hijacking of an aircraft may 
be subject to universal jurisdiction, but the Court decided to rule against 
Yunis on other grounds,103 leaving open the question of whether activities 
which are proscribed by Treaty are subject to the doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction.  
The general rule is that “jurisdiction does not lie under the 
Universal Principle merely because the crime is subject to an international 
agreement. Rather, customary law must accept the crime as subject to 
universal jurisdiction.”104  However, implicit in that statement is the idea 
that international law will accept a crime as subject to universal 
jurisdiction if the crime is prohibited by a Treaty that is signed by a 
substantial number of parties.105  In fact, crimes that are subject to 
universal jurisdiction are often a matter of international convention or 
treaty.106 
This is an important issue in terms of nuclear smuggling. The 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials prohibits “the 
receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of 
nuclear material” and the “theft or robbery of nuclear material” by non-
                                                 
102 United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899-903 (D.D.C. 1988) rev'd on other 
grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [Yunis I]. 
103 Yunis II, 924 F.2d at 1092. 
104 United States v. Suerte, No. 00-0659, 2001 WL 1877264, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jun 06, 
2001), rev'd on other grounds, by United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2002). 
105 See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) rev'd on other 
grounds, by Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that crimes 
condemned by the world community and subject to prosecution under universal 
jurisdiction are often a matter of international conventions or treaties. The only 
requirement is that these treaties be signed by a significant number of states.); see also 
Yunis I, 681 F.Supp. 899-903 (holding that airplane hijacking is universally condemned 
based on several international treaties that specifically forbid hijacking). 
106 Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582. 
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state actors.107  Also, sixty-eight countries are party to the agreement, 
which is a substantial number of nations. This may be enough for the 
international community to consider nuclear smuggling a crime that is so 
widely condemned that it is subject to the doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction. However, it is problematic that the Convention applies solely 
to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, courts might 
be willing to expand this to include military nuclear material when 
deciding whether universal jurisdiction should apply. Nuclear smuggling, 
whether it involves peaceful or military material, should certainly fit 
within the category of “certain terrorist acts” that are covered under 
universal jurisdiction.  
 
2. Solution of Last Resort 
Yet, the international community should still explicitly criminalize 
nuclear smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation by passing domestic 
laws that recognize these activities as international crimes because in 
many states customary international law must be incorporated into 
domestic law before the nation's courts will recognize such law in judicial 
proceedings.108 Courts are less likely to assert jurisdiction if the assertion 
requires a distinct measure of judicial creativity. Learned Hand once stated 
that “[w]e should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its 
courts can catch….”109 Therefore, relying solely on the doctrine of 
universal jurisdiction should be the last resort for punishing the crimes of 
nuclear smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation. The most viable 
options are for states to explicitly define these activities as international 
                                                 
107 Physical Protection Convention, at art. VII(1)(a)-(b), 18 U.S.C. § 831 (2000), 
available at http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism_convention_nuclear_material.html.). 
108 See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 39. 
109 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d. 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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crimes through the treaty process and to enact domestic laws in 
furtherance of those treaties.  
 
IV. DEVELOPING A MORE COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR 
SMUGGLING AND PROLIFERATION 
 
A. The UN Call to Arms 
The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee is in the process of 
developing a “comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing 
with international terrorism.”110  It is highly probable that one of these 
conventions will cover nuclear terrorism since U.N. Resolution 1373 
“notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism 
and…the illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other 
potentially deadly materials….”111  The U.N. will play a pivotal role in 
developing this convention on nuclear terrorism and it should continue to 
advocate for a comprehensive approach to preventing terrorist activities 
that addresses regional conflicts and the full range of global issues that are 
necessary to achieve international cooperation.112 
 
B.  Learning from Existing Treaties 
The U.N. Ad Hoc Committee must resolve a number of issues 
before actually drafting the new convention.113  Most importantly, it must 
                                                 
110 G.A. Res. 56/88 U.N. GAOR, Fifty-Sixth Session, 8th plen. mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/56/88 (2002). 
111 G.A. Res. 1373, U.N. GAOR, 4385th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc S/RES/1373 Meeting 
(2001), available at http://www.undcp.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf 
(emphasis added) (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). 
112 See G.A. Res. 1377 U.N. GAOR, 4413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377Meeting (2001), 
available at http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/633/01/PDF/N0163301.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
Jan, 26, 2004). 
113 See G.A. Res. 56/88 U.N. GAOR, supra note 111.Fifty-Sixth Session (2002). 
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decide how to address the inadequacies of the existing treaties.114  The 
NPT is a good case study because its language is broad enough to cover 
both nuclear smuggling and nuclear information proliferation. However, 
the NPT only applies to states. Any future convention on international 
terrorism must focus on preventing non-state actors from participating in 
the nuclear black market. The current lack of coverage for individuals is 
surprising and the international community should address the problem as 
soon as practicable.  
Furthermore, the new convention on nuclear terrorism should 
focus on prevention rather than punishment. It should attempt to 
preemptively curtail nuclear smuggling and information proliferation and 
not concentrate on punishment after the fact. Finally, the U.N. should 
expand the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to act 
as a monitoring body that observes and implements the convention's 
regulations. This is a practical decision because the International Atomic 
Energy Agency already performs such duties under its relationship with 
the NPT.   
C.  The Role of the IAEA 
The International Atomic Energy Agency works in tandem with 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty by establishing and enforcing safeguards to 
ensure that non-nuclear States do not use nuclear materials, equipment, 
and facilities to further a military purpose.115  The Agency is a perfect 
complement to the NPT,116 and it should also work extremely well under 
the new convention on nuclear terrorism. In 1994, “the Agency developed 
a program to address illicit trafficking of nuclear material,” which 
“focuses on helping countries strengthen their nuclear laws and 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 See LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, THE NONPROLIFERATION ROLE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC AGENCY: A CRITICAL ASSESMENT 21-30 (1985). 
116 See id. at 29. 
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infrastructures to ensure greater … security over these materials.” The 
new program also helps countries “detect and respond to illegal 
movements of radioactive materials....”117  Therefore, the IAEA is the 
ideal agency for combating nuclear terrorism under the new convention. 
Nevertheless, the IAEA faces several problems,118 including the fact that 
the Agency can only act through, and with the cooperation of, the 
governments of the countries it regulates.119  In order for the IAEA to be 
effective, governments must be willing to support and implement the 
Agency's proposed safeguards.  
The U.N. should adopt policies to strengthen the role of the IAEA, 
possibly even giving the IAEA control over the entire nuclear cycle.120 
However, most countries, especially the nuclear states, are probably not 
willing to relinquish total control. The best answer is to give the IAEA 
more funding and broader, though not unlimited, discretionary power. 
This will allow the agency to more aggressively and consistently enforce 
the rule of law.  
 
D.  Enlisting the Services of Interpol 
Interpol is an international police organization that facilitates 
cross-border criminal investigations among the organization's 181 member 
countries.121  Enlisting the services of Interpol and strengthening its 
international police capabilities pursuant to a treaty on nuclear terrorism 
are vital steps for overcoming inadequacies that are inherent in domestic 
                                                 
117 See International Atomic Energy Agency, at 3. 
118 See generally, SCHEINMAN, supra note 117, at 32-59 (Scheinman focuses on 
politicization and credibility as the major problems facing the IAEA). 
119 See Fugal, supra note 48, at 307. 
120 See id. at 308. 
121 Interpol, An Overview, at 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/Icpo/FactSheets/FS200101.asp. 
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investigatory techniques.122  The international character of nuclear 
smuggling and proliferation “implies that police efforts should transcend 
national boundaries.”123  Therefore, the U.N. and the IAEA should 
establish a working relationship with Interpol to more effectively combat 
these terrorist activities. Interpol has extensive experience with 
international terrorism, and it could help considerably in the efforts to 
prevent nuclear smuggling and proliferation by non-state actors.  
 
E. Passing Domestic Laws on Money Laundering 
The frequency of international terrorist acts is proportionate to the 
financing that terrorists receive. Therefore, the elimination of funding 
should result in the elimination of the activity. “It is critical that law 
enforcement target the financial sponsors of terrorist activities, not just the 
actual perpetrators of the terrorist acts.”124  U.N. Resolution 1373 calls for 
all nations to take “additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their 
territories through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any 
acts of terrorism.”125  Since terrorist funds are laundered through 
legitimate businesses, the U.N. should encourage countries to pass 
domestic laws that require greater scrutiny of suspect financial 
transactions.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The nuclear black market poses a serious threat to the international 
community. Since existing treaties are inadequate with regards to nuclear 
smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation by non-state actors, the 
                                                 
122 See Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 25, at 720. 
123 Id. at 719-20. 
124 See Interpol, The Financing of Terrorism, available at 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/Terrorism/financing.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
125 See G.A. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, supra note 112, at 1. 
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international community should specifically define these activities as 
international crimes under a new convention on nuclear terrorism. The 
new convention should focus on prevention rather than punishment, and it 
should encourage nations to enact domestic laws that support the character 
of the agreement. International cooperation is necessary for the convention 
to succeed and the U.N will play a pivotal role in ensuring this 
collaboration. Finally, enlisting the help of agencies like the IAEA and 
Interpol should greatly reduce the future occurrences of nuclear smuggling 
and nuclear information proliferation because both agencies have 
extensive experience with international terrorism. While these suggestions 
may not completely eliminate the possibility of non-state actors initiating 
future nuclear conflict, they should significantly reduce the threat.  
